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THE RESILIENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS AND 
THE FALSE HOPE OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS: 
THE CASE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND 
THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT 
Renée Lettow Lerner 
ABSTRACT—At first glance, there seem to be strong affinities between the 
Second Amendment and the Seventh Amendment. Both the right to keep and 
bear arms and the right to civil jury trial potentially empower ordinary 
citizens. Both could check elites. 
But there are crucial differences between these rights. I focus on two of 
them here. The first is relatively straightforward; it concerns individual 
accountability—or the lack thereof—and the ability to understand 
responsibilities. Gun owners and users generally have individual 
responsibility for their actions, and the ability to understand their 
responsibilities. In contrast, by design civil jurors lack individual 
responsibility. And they often have difficulty understanding judicial 
instructions and complicated scientific or mathematical evidence. 
Second, and more broadly, there are important differences between 
substantive and procedural rights. Substantive rights such as the Second 
Amendment have a core that can be interpreted and protected, regardless of 
the type of legal system. But specific procedural rights such as the Seventh 
Amendment are wholly dependent on the surrounding procedural system for 
their significance. Changes in the rest of the procedural system can easily 
subvert a specific procedural right, as we have seen with both criminal jury 
trials and civil jury trials. Substantive rights are potentially resilient; specific 
procedural rights are inherently fragile. Unfortunately, procedural rights, 
even when they have become almost obsolete, can thwart efforts to develop 
a more accurate and efficient method of adjudication. 
 
AUTHOR—Donald Phillip Rothschild Research Professor of Law, George 
Washington University Law School, rlerner@law.gwu.edu. I am grateful for 
the comments of Francesca Bignami, Bradford Clark, Robert Cottrol, Alida 
Kass, David Kopel, Craig Lerner, Nelson Lund, Ira Lupu, Dayna Matthew, 
Joan Meier, Darrell Miller, Alan Morrison, Sean Murphy, Richard Pierce, 
Daniel Polsby, Kate Shaw, Parker Shippen, Peter Smith, and Alice Ristroph. 
  
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
276 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 276 
I. INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY AND UNDERSTANDING RESPONSIBILITY .................. 279 
A. The Incentives and Knowledge of Gun Owners and Users ......................... 279 
B. Civil Jurors: Collective Decision-Making and Confusion .......................... 283 
1. Civil Jurors’ Lack of Individual Responsibility .................................. 283 
2. Civil Jurors’ Lack of Understanding of Law and Facts ...................... 287 
3. Controversy over the Civil Jury at the Founding: Hamilton’s  
Critique ............................................................................................... 288 
II. SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS VERSUS PROCEDURAL RIGHTS........................................... 290 
A. Definitions of Substance and Procedure ..................................................... 290 
B. The Importance of the Distinction Between Substance and Procedure ...... 295 
C. Procedural Rights Not Compatible with All Legal Systems: The 
Problem of Incorporation ........................................................................... 298 
D. The Terminal Decay of the Seventh Amendment ......................................... 302 
1. The Vanishing Civil Jury .................................................................... 303 
2. What a Juryless Civil Procedure Could Look Like ............................. 304 
E. The Resilience of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms ................................... 306 
1. Potential Weaknesses of Substantive Rights ....................................... 307 
2. The Fall and Rise of the Second Amendment ...................................... 308 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 312 
 
INTRODUCTION 
At first glance, there seem to be strong affinities between the Second 
Amendment and the Seventh Amendment. Both the right to keep and bear 
arms and the right to civil jury trial potentially empower ordinary citizens. 
Both could check elites.1 
But there are crucial differences between these rights. I focus on two of 
them here. The first is relatively straightforward—it concerns individual 
accountability, or the lack thereof, and the ability to understand 
responsibilities.2 Gun owners and users have direct individual liability for 
their actions. This individual liability seems to encourage decent behavior; 
holders of carry permits, in particular, are remarkably law-abiding. They 
 
 1 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 46–59, 87–88 
(1998); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 235–36 (2005) (explaining how 
constitutional rights to juries, including civil juries, empower ordinary citizens); id. at 322–26 (explaining 
how a right to keep and bear arms empowers ordinary citizens). In an elegant article, Professor Darrell 
Miller has recommended parallel interpretation of the two amendments. See generally Darrell A.H. 
Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh Amendment Can Teach Us About the Second, 
122 YALE L.J. 852 (2013) (suggesting the Seventh Amendment’s historical test can inform courts in 
crafting a clearer test for the Second Amendment). 
 2 See infra Part I. 
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may even be more law-abiding than police officers. Furthermore, their 
responsibilities are relatively easy for ordinary persons to understand. In 
contrast, civil jurors lack any individual accountability for their decisions 
and have a hard time understanding their job. The result is unpredictable and 
wayward verdicts. These drawbacks are why the right to a civil jury trial was 
so controversial at the time of the founding. I focus particularly on Alexander 
Hamilton’s critique of the civil jury in Federalist No. 83. 
The second difference is more complicated. It has to do with the 
distinction between a substantive right and a procedural right.3 Substantive 
rights, I hope to show, are potentially more durable and effective than 
detailed procedural rights. There is a solid core to a substantive right that is 
amenable to meaningful interpretation, whereas specific procedural rights 
prove to be flimsy. The meaning of a particular procedure or legal institution 
depends on the surrounding legal system as a whole. When other parts of the 
legal system change, the significance of that procedure or legal institution 
can change dramatically—it can essentially be nullified, even though 
nominally, it still exists. Worse, procedural rights cause positive harm to the 
legal system by requiring clumsy work-arounds for problems and thwarting 
more direct solutions. 
Why compare these two rights, as opposed to some other pair of 
substantive and procedural rights in the first eight Amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution? In the past few decades, the contrast between the Second and 
the Seventh Amendments has been particularly striking. The right to keep 
and bear arms has had a remarkable resurgence, at both the popular and the 
judicial levels. This revival is not guaranteed to last—especially at the 
judicial level—but at least it can be done. 
Meanwhile, the Seventh Amendment by its terms requires an originalist 
interpretation (“shall be preserved”), and the federal courts have indeed tried 
to apply a historical test.4 Even so, the attempt at preservation has been a 
failure. Courts have developed many mechanisms to avoid civil jury trial, 
and litigants have fled from it by settling. As of 2020, fewer than one percent 
of civil cases reaching disposition in federal court are decided by jury trial.5 
Our civil justice system today is vastly expensive to litigants, full of delays, 
and unpredictable. Persons of modest means are almost entirely shut out of 
 
 3 See infra Section II.B. 
 4 See Miller, supra note 1, at 872–93; Renée Lettow Lerner, The Failure of Originalism in Preserving 
Constitutional Rights to Civil Jury Trial, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 811, 813, 836–45 (2014). 
 5 Of federal civil cases reaching disposition after court action, jury trial occurred in 0.59%. ADMIN. 
OFF. OF U.S. CTS., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 2020 TABLES tbl.C-4 (Mar. 31, 2020), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2020-tables [https://perma.cc/8UMP-
VEYD] (reporting 1,443 civil jury trials out of 244,812 total dispositions after court action). 
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it, or suffer grievous disadvantages. This Essay shows how the civil justice 
system could be greatly improved if we were free from the constitutional 
constraint of the civil jury. The Seventh Amendment, as Hamilton warned, 
provides an especially apt illustration of the problems of constitutionalizing 
specific procedural rights. 
Other legal scholars have pointed to some of the problems with 
procedural rights. In an essay about criminal sentencing, Professor James 
Whitman observed, “Procedural protections are comparatively weak, easily 
evaded, and difficult to generalize beyond their point of departure. 
Substantive protections, by contrast, are comparatively strong.”6 Legal 
writers have expressed concern about the constitutional rights revolution in 
criminal procedure that began in the 1960s.7 Professor John Langbein 
pointed out that the Sixth Amendment right to a criminal jury trial has been 
a “spectacular failure.”8 Plea bargaining has almost swallowed it. Professor 
Langbein commented on the fragility of written constitutions in general and 
their susceptibility to being undermined by the legal profession.9 I believe 
that insight is especially true of procedural rights, embedded as they are in a 
legal system dominated by the legal profession. Procedural rights are 
particularly easy for the legal profession to manipulate and to alter without 
anyone else noticing. For example, many members of the public may be 
unaware of the virtual disappearance of civil and criminal jury trials.10 
My aim here is to deepen our understanding of the differences between 
substantive and procedural rights. I discuss how to distinguish between the 
two and the importance of the distinction to the rule of law. The Second 
Amendment and the Seventh Amendment provide telling examples of the 
resilience of substantive rights, and the fragility of procedural rights. 
Part I of this Essay discusses individual responsibility and 
comprehension of this responsibility. It is divided into two Sections. The first 
addresses the responsibility and knowledge of gun owners and users. It 
 
 6 James Q. Whitman, What Happened to Tocqueville’s America?, 74 SOC. RSCH. 251, 263 (2007). 
 7 See, e.g., WILLIAM T. PIZZI, THE SUPREME COURT’S ROLE IN MASS INCARCERATION 1 (2021) 
(“[T]he Supreme Court has contributed to the rise in our incarceration rate because the so-called ‘criminal 
procedure revolution’ made trials increasingly unworkable and indirectly led to a system in which plea 
bargaining dominates.”); GEORGE C. THOMAS III, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: HOW THE AMERICAN 
JUSTICE SYSTEM SACRIFICES INNOCENT DEFENDANTS 155–56 (2008) (discussing the Warren Court as 
“seek[ing] nothing short of a revolution in federal regulation of state criminal processes in the 1960s”). 
See generally F. Andrew Hessick & Elizabeth Fisher, Structural Rights and Incorporation, 71 ALA. L. 
REV. 163 (2019) (arguing that federal constitutional jury rights intrude deeply on state sovereignty and 
thus should not be incorporated against the states). 
 8 John H. Langbein, On the Myth of Written Constitutions: The Disappearance of Criminal Jury 
Trial, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 119 (1992). 
 9 Id. at 126–27. 
 10 See id. at 120–21. 
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provides data concerning crimes committed by legal gun owners to 
demonstrate that there is an incentive for gun owners and users to be law-
abiding, and it discusses the easily comprehensible nature of this 
responsibility. The second Section focuses on the Seventh Amendment and 
the contrasting lack of responsibility and knowledge of civil jurors. I explain 
Hamilton’s related critique of the civil jury in Federalist No. 83, and his 
warning that it would be unwise to put such a procedural right into the U.S. 
Constitution. 
Part II analyzes the distinction between substantive and procedural 
rights in five Sections. The first defines “substantive” and “procedural” 
rights. The second explains the importance of the separation of procedure 
and substance for the rule of law. The third demonstrates that specific 
procedural rights are not compatible with all legal systems and discusses the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s struggles over incorporation of procedural rights. The 
fourth describes the historical decay of the right to a civil jury trial and 
outlines the important reforms that could occur in the civil justice system if 
we were free of civil jury trial, or the threat thereof. The fifth examines some 
of the potential weaknesses of substantive rights, the rise of gun control laws 
in the wake of a massive increase in violent crime beginning in the 1960s, 
and the current burgeoning exercise of the right to keep and bear arms. 
The Essay concludes by highlighting the distinction between the two 
Amendments. The substantive nature of the Second Amendment has made it 
revivable, while the procedural nature of the Seventh Amendment makes it 
unlikely, and undesirable, to resuscitate. The Conclusion offers thoughts 
about the wisdom of constitutionalizing specific procedural rights, and 
suggestions for courts that must interpret such rights. 
I. INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY AND UNDERSTANDING RESPONSIBILITY 
First, we take up the question of individual responsibility and 
comprehension of responsibilities. Successful public policy depends on 
paying close attention to the accountability principle. Who is accountable, 
and how is that accountability enforced? Incentives matter. Gun owners and 
users have considerable incentives to behave responsibly; civil jurors have 
very few. 
A. The Incentives and Knowledge of Gun Owners and Users 
Freedom should entail responsibility.11 This is the case with gun owners 
and users. Gun owners and users have direct, individual responsibility for 
 
 11 This point has tended to be ignored or downplayed recently. See NIGEL BIGGAR, WHAT’S WRONG 
WITH RIGHTS? 334 (2020). 
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their actions. They have an incentive to be careful because of concern for the 
safety of their families and friends. And if they do something foolish or 
malicious with a gun, they are individually liable—not just liable under civil 
law, but also criminal law. They may be sued or prosecuted for what they 
do. Such individual liability has a way of focusing the mind. 
This individual responsibility seems to have an effect on behavior. 
Proponents of gun-carry bans predicted mayhem in the streets after Florida 
passed a permissive concealed-carry law in 1987.12 But these dire predictions 
have not come to pass. Permissive concealed-carry laws appear to have had 
no adverse effect on public safety.13 It is impossible to know the number of 
firearms legally in private hands in the United States, although most 
estimates put the number at over 300 million.14 It is also hard to know how 
many legal gun owners commit crimes with their guns, as there are problems 
defining that category. For example, does it include someone unlawfully 
carrying or unlawfully storing a gun the person had legally purchased for a 
lawful purpose? 
The most solid data available on crime rates for legal gun owners in the 
United States concern holders of concealed-carry licenses. States generally 
keep track of how many licenses are issued, and also the crimes that holders 
of these licenses commit. There may well be differences between the crime 
profiles of carry-license holders and those of other legal gun owners. But for 
now, the best data we have concerns carry-permit holders. 
For some persons, holders of concealed-carry permits seem to raise 
special concerns. In a church in Texas in December 2019, a volunteer 
 
 12 See, e.g., Stephen Koff, Bob Port, Margaret L. Usdansky & Charlotte Sutton, Some Seek Repeal 
of Gun Law, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 17, 1988, at 15A (quoting Hernando County Commissioner 
Len Tria as saying, “It scares me. I’ll hate to see the death statistics that will come in before the Legislature 
wakes up and changes its mind”); Lisa Getter, Accused Criminals Get Gun Permits, MIAMI HERALD, 
May 15, 1988, at 1A, 14A (quoting Miami Police Chief Clarence Dickson calling the new law “needless 
and foolhardy,” and Florida Attorney General Bob Butterworth as saying, “[t]his is the worst thing I can 
think of in my 20 years of public service”); Sam Howe Verhovek, States Seek to Let Citizens Carry 
Concealed Weapons, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1995, at A1 (“Opponents of the bills . . . contend that more 
guns will only spur more violence, and some paint modern-day Dodge City scenarios in which routine 
fender-bender accidents could escalate into bloody duels among gun-toting motorists.”). 
 13 GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 411–14 (2005) [hereinafter 
KLECK, POINT BLANK]; GARY KLECK, TARGETING GUNS: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL 367–72 
(1997) [hereinafter KLECK, TARGETING GUNS]. In 1995, The New York Times admitted that “Florida’s 
experience has generally provided strong arguments for proponents of the right-to-carry bills . . . . Even 
those who opposed the measure said it had not led to the increase in violence they had feared. . . . 
[H]andgun-related homicides in Florida dropped by 29 percent from 1987 to 1992 . . . .” Verhovek, supra 
note 12, at A14. 
 14 See, e.g., AARON KARP, SMALL ARMS SURVEY, ESTIMATING GLOBAL CIVILIAN-HELD FIREARMS 
NUMBERS 4 (2018), http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-BP-
Civilian-Firearms-Numbers.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RP3-3M6M] (estimating that in 2017 there were 
393,300,000 firearms in private hands in the United States). 
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security guard with a concealed-carry permit shot and killed a gunman who 
had just shot and killed two members of the church. The permit holder did 
this within six seconds of the gunman opening fire. Speaking about this 
incident at a campaign stop days later, Michael Bloomberg said: 
I wasn’t there . . . . I don’t know the facts—that somebody in the congregation 
had their own gun and killed the person who murdered two other people. But 
it’s the job of law enforcement to have guns and to decide when to shoot. You 
just do not want the average citizen carrying a gun in a crowded place.15 
The data should help to assuage Mr. Bloomberg’s concerns. First, there 
are considerable benefits to gun ownership and carry. Defensive uses of 
firearms occur at least 67,000 times per year, according to a study by a pro-
gun-control group using data compiled by the FBI.16 And of course we do 
not know how many crimes are prevented because victims may be armed. 
Gun accidents are rare, and most of them occur at home, not during defensive 
use.17 
Second, concealed-carry-permit holders are remarkably law-abiding. 
Not only do they commit far fewer crimes than the general population—they 
may commit fewer crimes than police officers. And there are a lot of them. 
According to statistics through April 30, 2021, Florida alone had 2,363,898 
 
 15 Editorial, Bloomberg Misfires on Jack Wilson, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/bloomberg-misfires-on-jack-wilson-11579219312 [https://perma.cc/J8FA-VL79]. 
 16 VIOLENCE POL’Y CTR., FIREARM JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDES AND NON-FATAL SELF-DEFENSE GUN 
USE: AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION 
SURVEY DATA 6 (2015), http://vpc.org/studies/justifiable15.pdf [https://perma.cc/9UKR-TWXP]. This is 
considered to be a low estimate. U.S. surveys that ask respondents directly whether they have used a gun 
defensively have produced estimates ranging from 760,000 annually to 3 million. NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON, 
DAVID B. KOPEL, GEORGE A. MOCSARY & MICHAEL P. O’SHEA, FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND 
AMENDMENT: REGULATION, RIGHTS, AND POLICY 18 (2d ed. 2018). A 2013 study commissioned by the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reported, “Almost all national survey estimates indicate that 
defensive gun uses by victims are at least as common as offensive uses by criminals, with estimates of 
annual uses ranging from about 500,000 to more than 3 million . . . .” INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RSCH. 
COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., PRIORITIES FOR RESEARCH TO REDUCE THE THREAT OF FIREARM-
RELATED VIOLENCE 15 (Alan I. Leshner, Bruce M. Altevogt, Arlene F. Lee, Margaret A. McCoy & 
Patrick W. Kelley eds., 2013) (citation omitted). Violent crimes committed with firearms were estimated 
at 300,000 for 2008. Id. 
 17 See KLECK, POINT BLANK, supra note 13, at 269–319; id. at 304 (“The risk of a gun accident is 
extremely low, even among defensive gun owners, except among a very small, identifiably high-risk 
subset of the population.”); KLECK, TARGETING GUNS, supra note 13, at 293–324; id. at 321 (“Most gun 
accidents occur in the home . . . . [V]ery few accidents occur in connection with actual defensive uses of 
guns. Gun accidents are generally committed by unusually reckless people with records of heavy 
drinking, repeated involvement in automobile crashes, many traffic citations, and prior arrests for 
assault.”). Accidental firearms deaths have been falling for the past four decades, including for children, 
and are today at an all-time low, despite widespread gun ownership. JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 16, at 
22–25 (discussing the plunging fatal-gun-accident rates and some possible causes). 
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valid concealed-carry license holders.18 For the period from July 1, 2019 to 
June 30, 2020, Florida revoked 1,546 concealed-carry permits.19 Using these 
numbers, which are close in time, this is an annual revocation rate of just 
under 0.068%—hundredths of a percent. Florida requires revocation of these 
licenses for all felony convictions and certain misdemeanor convictions, and 
there is an option to revoke in certain instances such as mental or physical 
incapacitation.20 To provide some comparison, in 2019 the rate of violent 
crime in Florida as a percentage of the population was 0.382%.21 
In other states, rates of conviction for crimes committed by gun-permit 
holders are similarly low. In February 2020, a Texas official testified that 1.4 
million persons in Texas had licenses to carry a handgun.22 An official state 
report for 2020 shows that the total number of convictions that year for all 
crimes committed in Texas was 26,304. That year, the number of convictions 
for crimes committed by handgun-license holders was 114.23 This indicates 
a conviction rate by handgun-license holders of about 0.0081%—a 
minuscule rate. 
The crime rate of carry-permit holders may be lower than that of police 
officers. Large studies of the crime rates of police officers are scarce. One of 
the most prominent studies, for the period from 2005 to 2011, indicated that 
the arrest rate for state and local officers was about 0.072%.24 (This is just 
 
 18 FLA. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & CONSUMER SERVS., DIV. OF LICENSING, CONCEALED WEAPON OR 
FIREARM LICENSE SUMMARY REPORT, OCTOBER 1, 1987 - APRIL 30, 2021 [hereinafter SUMMARY 
REPORT], https://www.fdacs.gov/content/download/7499/file/cw_monthly.pdf [https://perma.cc/VY55-
RC2L]. 
 19 FLA. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & CONSUMER SERVS., DIV. OF LICENSING, CONCEALED WEAPON OR 
FIREARM LICENSE REPORTS, APPLICATIONS AND DISPOSITIONS BY COUNTY, JULY 01, 2019 - JUNE  
30, 2020, https://www.fdacs.gov/content/download/84469/file/07012019_06302020_cw_annual.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G8PM-588W]. 
 20 FLA. STAT. §§ 790.06, .23 (2020). Unfortunately, Florida no longer collects statistics on how many 
of these revocations were due to firearms violations, but the number is likely to be low. For all the years 
from 1987 through 2010, the total number of concealed-carry permits revoked because of a firearms 
violation was 168. SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 18. 
 21 FLA. STAT. ANALYSIS CTR., FLORIDA STATEWIDE REPORTED VIOLENT CRIME, BY OFFENSE AND 
YEAR, 1971 - 2019., https://www.fdle.state.fl.us/FSAC/Documents/PDF/2019/Total_Violent_Crime. 
aspx [https://perma.cc/G59V-EP69]. I have not been able to find statistics showing the felony conviction 
rate per population in Florida. 
 22 Wes Rapaport, State Police in Texas Issued 1 Million Licenses to Carry Firearms in Last Decade, 
KXAN (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.kxan.com/news/texas-politics/state-police-in-texas-issued-1-
million-licenses-to-carry-firearms-in-last-decade/ [https://perma.cc/J3DG-SDAW]. 
 23 TEX. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, CONVICTION RATES FOR HANDGUN LICENSE HOLDERS, REPORTING 
PERIOD: 01/01/2020 - 12/31/2020, at 5 (2021), https://www.dps.texas.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
rsd/ltc/reports/convictionratesreport2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GXC-EANW]. 
 24 PHILIP MATTHEW STINSON SR., JOHN LIEDERBACH, STEVEN P. LAB & STEVEN L. BREWER JR., 
POLICE INTEGRITY LOST: A STUDY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS ARRESTED 21 (2016), 
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over the revocation rate for Florida concealed-carry licenses.) The authors 
found that, during this period, officers were convicted in 2,846 cases,25 an 
average of about 407 a year. The federal Bureau of Justice Statistics reports 
that, for the year 2011, there were 768,287 sworn law enforcement officers.26 
For a variety of reasons, it seems likely that the study undercounts the 
number of crimes committed by police officers. The study relied on 
collecting media accounts of officer crime, and so does not capture all 
instances of arrest or conviction. In addition, crimes by police are likely 
underreported compared with crimes by others. Therefore, not only does the 
rate of police crime found by the study seem to be higher than the rate for 
Texas handgun-license holders, it may actually be even higher than 
indicated. 
The data therefore suggest that legal gun owners and users are careful 
to obey the law. Furthermore, the legal responsibilities that gun owners and 
users have are relatively simple and readily understood by ordinary persons. 
It doesn’t require an advanced degree to understand the notion of reckless 
endangerment, or the possible consequences of a toddler getting hold of a 
loaded gun. To be sure, certain requirements that governments impose can 
be precise, such as storing guns in a locked container unless they are 
equipped with certain safety devices.27 But again, these requirements are not 
difficult to understand. 
B. Civil Jurors: Collective Decision-Making and Confusion 
Unlike gun owners, civil jurors lack individual responsibility and have 
difficulty understanding the tasks that they are assigned. Indeed, this lack of 
accountability and confusion were why civil juries were controversial at the 
time of the Founding. 
1. Civil Jurors’ Lack of Individual Responsibility 
Contrast the individual responsibility of gun owners and users—and 
their ability to understand their responsibility—with that of civil jurors. 
Juries are designed precisely to avoid individual responsibility. English high 
court judge and criminologist James Fitzjames Stephen pointed out that the 
 
https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249850.pdf [https://perma.cc/LWK2-R9F6]. The study found 
that officers were arrested from 2005 to 2011 in 6,724 cases. Id. at 238 tbl.1. A total of 5,545 officers 
were arrested (some officers were arrested more than once). Id. at 21. 
 25 Id. at 403 fig.1; see also id. at 244 tbl.5 (suggesting there have been 2,195 convictions). 
 26 DUREN BANKS, JOSHUA HENDRIX, MATTHEW HICKMAN & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST., OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, BUR. OF JUST. STATS., NATIONAL SOURCES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 
EMPLOYMENT DATA 2 tbl.1 (2016). https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/nsleed.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
5M6Y-U9TX]. 
 27 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131L(a) (2021). 
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traditional number of jurors—twelve—is enough to preclude any notion of 
individual responsibility.28 The modern move to six jurors focuses 
responsibility somewhat more, but still leaves individual jurors with cover. 
The traditional requirement of unanimity further shields jurors from 
individual responsibility. Unless the parties agree otherwise, federal civil 
juries are still required to be unanimous.29 And jury deliberations occur in 
secret. Jurors do not give reasons for what they do. 
Not only do jurors engage in purely collective, secret decision-making, 
they are entirely shielded from the consequences of a faulty decision. If a 
jury completely misunderstands the evidence, or the instructions on the law, 
or is improperly swayed by the emotional arguments of counsel, or flagrantly 
disregards the law or the evidence, there is no consequence to the jurors 
whatsoever. They cannot be imprisoned, fined, or in any way punished. The 
English courts ended those practices in 1670 in Bushell’s Case, thus tacitly 
approving jury nullification.30 Today, the judge congratulates the jurors on 
reaching a verdict and thanks them profusely for their service, regardless of 
whether they have botched the decision. 
The consequences of civil jurors’ lack of individual responsibility for 
their decisions are legion. One of the most salient has to do with giving away 
other peoples’ money. Studies have consistently shown that the area of 
greatest disagreement between judges and jurors is damages.31 Judges do 
have some individual responsibility for their decisions. Judges are named as 
the decision-makers, either alone or in a small group; must generally give 
reasons for their decisions; usually care about reversal by appellate courts; 
and often are concerned about their reputations among other judges and 
 
 28 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 568 (London, 
MacMillan & Co. 1883) (the number twelve is enough “to destroy even the appearance of individual 
responsibility”). 
 29 FED. R. CIV. P. 48(b). 
 30 See 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1011–12 (C.P. 1670). 
 31 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Judge-Jury Difference in Punitive Damages 
Awards: Who Listens to the Supreme Court?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 325, 327–28 (2011) 
(discussing judge–jury differences with respect to punitive damage awards); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, 
Evaluating Juries by Comparison to Judges: A Benchmark for Judging?, 32 FLA. STATE U. L. REV. 469, 
477–78, 481 (2005) (explaining that jury awards are, on average, twenty percent higher than judges would 
have awarded, and that half of the time, judges would have awarded less than the jury); R. Perry Sentell 
Jr., The Georgia Jury and Negligence: The View from the Bench, 26 GA. L. REV. 85, 102–06 (1991) 
(detailing more data about judge–jury differences in damages awards in Georgia); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., 
The Georgia Jury and Negligence: The View from the (Federal) Bench, 27 GA. L. REV. 59, 74–77 (1992) 
(detailing similar findings in federal court); Harry Kalven Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. 
REV. 1055, 1065–66 (1964) (arguing that the “jury’s sense of equity” is what accounts for the judge–jury 
discrepancy in damage awards, and not the jury’s “relative competence” as compared to judges); HARRY 
KALVEN JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 64 n.13 (1966) (stating that juries award damages 
twenty percent higher than judges on average). 
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lawyers. Jurors lack almost all of these characteristics. As Montesquieu 
wrote, after their service, jurors melt back into the population, invisible.32 
There is therefore some constraint on judges in awarding damages that there 
is not on jurors. Jurors are prone to the typical effects on most humans of 
spending others’ money on someone else, with no accountability.33 The 
problem is well illustrated by the 2009 tweet of an Arkansas civil juror: “I 
just gave away TWELVE MILLION DOLLARS of somebody else’s 
money!”34 
Although after 1670 jurors could not be disciplined, their faults could 
at least be revealed. There was a practice of occasionally opening the black 
box of the jury’s deliberations and of awarding new trials because of what 
was found. For a while, English and American judges spoke with jurors, or 
accepted juror affidavits, about misconduct during deliberations.35 
Sometimes that misconduct turned out to be flipping coins or drawing straws 
to decide cases.36 Juries also used quotient verdicts, in which each juror came 
up with a number for damages and the jury averaged them.37 There is no 
reason to think that quotient verdicts have disappeared.38 
But in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, English and 
American judges put severe limits on accepting juror affidavits. They argued 
that accepting juror affidavits would open the door for the losing party to 
tamper with jurors after a verdict and would allow a single dissatisfied juror 
to destroy a verdict.39 The finality of jury verdicts would be undermined. The 
difficulty was that the refusal to accept juror affidavits meant rejecting 
relevant evidence of juror misconduct. It came at a high cost. 
For example, in 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that a trial judge 
was correct to reject several juror affidavits stating that the jury in that case—
a complicated fraud prosecution with a trial lasting six weeks—was “on one 
 
 32 CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 158 (Anne M. 
Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller & Harold Samuel Stone trans. & eds., 1989) (1748). 
 33 See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 116–19 
(1980) (arguing that a person spending someone else’s money on another person likely will not economize 
and will not seek the highest value). 
 34 David Chartier, Juror’s Twitter Posts Cited in Motion for Mistrial, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 15, 2009, 
9:15 PM), https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2009/03/jurors-twitter-posts-cited-in-motion-
for-mistrial/ [https://perma.cc/JSL6-EJL6]. 
 35 Renée B. Lettow, New Trial for Verdict Against Law: Judge-Jury Relations in Early Nineteenth-
Century America, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 527–36 (1996). 
 36 Michael Tackeff, Justice by Lot: The Taboo of Chance Verdicts in America, 16 U. SAINT THOMAS 
L.J. 209, 212, 214–16 (2020) (defining and discussing the different types of “chance verdicts”).  
 37 Id. at 215–16, 236–39, 265–68. 
 38 Although it is impossible to know how often quotient verdicts occur, they almost certainly still 
exist. I have been told of several by different former jurors in personal conversations. 
 39 Lettow, supra note 35, at 533–40. 
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big party.”40 During breaks, the jurors allegedly consumed multiple mixed 
drinks and pitchers of beer, as well as marijuana and cocaine.41 Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor, writing for a unanimous Court, was concerned that allowing 
such affidavits would undermine “the community’s trust in a system that 
relies on the decisions of laypeople.”42 Shining light into the jury room, she 
worried, would destroy the institution altogether. “It is not at all clear . . . 
that the jury system could survive such efforts to perfect it.”43 Not only were 
jurors not to be held accountable for such incidents, the incidents could not 
even be revealed.44 
Justice O’Connor’s predictions are being tested, however, by the 2017 
case Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, in which the Court decided that juror 
affidavits should be accepted to show racial or ethnic bias on the part of a 
juror.45 This has potential to be a significant change from the federal rule that 
juror affidavits regarding statements during deliberations will not be 
allowed. One thing that seems certain is that allowing such affidavits will 
diminish the finality of verdicts and further decrease prosecutors’ already-
low enthusiasm for jury trial. 
Concerning juror incentives, many judges say that jurors try very hard 
to fulfill their responsibilities.46 No doubt many do. Judges also report that 
they themselves have high levels of satisfaction with the jury system.47 But, 
as I have explained in detail elsewhere, on this question judges cannot be 
unthinkingly trusted.48 Concerning juries, judges are highly interested 
witnesses. Use of juries, or the threat of juries, absolves judges of a great 
deal of responsibility. Where juries are used, or threatened, judges do not 
have to decide cases on the merits, with all the attendant work of writing an 
opinion that will survive appeal. Not only that, but through use of juries, 
judges can present themselves as above the partisan fray in our adversarial 
 
 40 Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 115, 125, 127 (1987); see also Warger v. Shauers, 574 U.S. 
40, 44–45, 51–52 (2014) (refusing to accept juror affidavits indicating that the foreperson had lied on voir 
dire about experience with an issue central to the case). 
 41 Tanner, 483 U.S. at 135–36. 
 42 Id. at 121. 
 43 Id. at 120. 
 44 Id. at 120–21. 
 45 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017). 
 46 See, e.g., Robbennolt, supra note 31, at 481–82 (summarizing previous surveys of judges on the 
jury system). 
 47 Id. 
 48 Renée Lettow Lerner, The Surprising Views of Montesquieu and Tocqueville About Juries: Juries 
Empower Judges, 81 LA. L. REV. 1, 16–18 (2020) (“Professional judges are often reluctant to admit that 
they are glad juries spare them the hard work and responsibility of judging.”). 
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system, as referees making sure procedures are followed, not soiling their 
hands by asking questions and trying to understand the merits more deeply.49 
Almost the only persons involved in the legal system who are willing 
to describe in detail the serious problems with juror incentives are trial 
consultants.50 Their accounts are eye-opening. Trial consultants have a 
special need to understand jury decision-making accurately. So do trial 
lawyers, but lawyers fear to publicly criticize the jury, as they might appear 
as advocates in front of one. However, lawyers’ concern about jury decision-
making is revealed in their intense interest in jury selection and voir dire. 
There are a number of books about how to choose a jury that will be 
sympathetic to one’s client before any evidence is heard.51 
2. Civil Jurors’ Lack of Understanding of Law and Facts 
But even if a juror is soberly trying to do his or her level best, the task 
is daunting. Civil cases today are often complicated. Many studies have 
shown that jurors have trouble understanding the judge’s instructions on the 
law, especially concerning damages.52 
Jurors also can have difficulty understanding the facts. Much evidence 
today concerns complex transactions or advanced technology, and is in 
scientific or mathematical form. These topics and forms of evidence do not 
play to the strengths of ordinary jurors—particularly when one side has great 
incentive to remove anyone educated from the jury.53 And dueling partisan 
 
 49 See id. at 16–17. 
 50 See, e.g., DAVID TUNNO, FIXING THE ENGINE OF JUSTICE: DIAGNOSIS AND REPAIR OF OUR JURY 
SYSTEM 35–44 (2012) (detailing many errors that jurors are prone to make because of bias). David Tunno 
is a trial consultant. See id. at xv–xvi. 
 51 See, e.g., JEFFREY T. FREDERICK, MASTERING VOIR DIRE AND JURY SELECTION: GAIN AN EDGE 
IN QUESTIONING AND SELECTING YOUR JURY (4th ed. 2019); RONALD H. CLARK & THOMAS M. 
O’TOOLE, JURY SELECTION HANDBOOK: THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF EFFECTIVE JURY SELECTION (2018); 
ANGELA M. DODGE, WINNING AT JURY SELECTION: A HANDBOOK OF PRACTICAL JURY-FOCUSED 
TECHNIQUES & STRATEGIES (2010). 
 52 See, e.g., Dennis J. Devine, Laura D. Clayton, Benjamin B. Dunford, Rasmy Seying & Jennifer 
Pryce, Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCH. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 622, 666–68, 669–700 (2001) (summarizing studies over the previous forty-five years); Shari 
Seidman Diamond, Beth Murphy & Mary R. Rose, The “Kettleful of Law” in Real Jury Deliberations: 
Successes, Failures, and Next Steps, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1537, 1555–60, 1564–66, 1569–70, 1574–75 
(2012) (detailing various types of errors jurors make, especially with respect to instructions and the law); 
Franklin Strier, The Educated Jury: A Proposal for Complex Litigation, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 49, 51–54 
(1997) (asserting that “understanding the law is often the most difficult task for the juror”); Molly 
Armour, Comment, Dazed and Confused: The Need for a Legislative Solution to the Constitutional 
Problem of Juror Incomprehension, 17 TEMP. POL. & C.R.L. REV. 641, 652, 655 (2008) (arguing that 
studies have conclusively demonstrated that jury instructions are often incomprehensible to jurors). 
 53 See TUNNO, supra note 50, at 23–34, 119–22 (detailing different types of cases in which one of 
the parties tried to remove anyone educated from the jury, or benefited from having incompetent persons 
on the jury). 
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expert witnesses can add to juror confusion. Jurors are often baffled.54 As a 
result, litigators presenting a case to a jury go to great lengths to reduce the 
case to simple terms. In the process, the issues can be hopelessly distorted. 
For example, a litigant at trial in an intellectual property case might strongly 
emphasize a trade dress claim because that is easier for jurors to understand, 
and thus hope to win jurors’ favor on a complicated patent infringement 
claim, which is really the most important issue in the case. 
3. Controversy over the Civil Jury at the Founding: 
Hamilton’s Critique 
Jurors’ lack of accountability and confusion were precisely why civil 
juries were controversial at the time of the American Founding. The Seventh 
Amendment right to civil jury trial was much more controversial than the 
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.55 The Anti-Federalists were 
alarmed that the draft of the new Constitution coming from the convention 
in Philadelphia contained no right to a civil jury trial. This concerned them 
for two reasons. First, they viewed the power of the federal judiciary as 
excessive and unchecked. At least juries could provide some check.56 
Second, and most importantly for our purposes here, the Anti-
Federalists were especially eager to have juries decide debt cases. During the 
1780s, state civil juries had shown bias in favor of debtors and against 
 
 54 See James R. Dillon, Expertise on Trial, 19 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 247, 276–79 (2018); 
Valerie P. Hans, David H. Kaye, B. Michael Dann, Erin J. Farley & Stephanie Albertson, Science in the 
Jury Box: Jurors’ Comprehension of Mitochondrial DNA Evidence, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 60, 60–61 
(2011); Strier, supra note 52, at 54–56; Eugene Morgulis, Note, Juror Reactions to Scientific Testimony: 
Unique Challenges in Complex Mass Torts, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 252, 254, 266–69, 278 (2009) 
(“[T]echnical difficulty [in a case] makes other irrational factors, such as ideological biases and emotional 
reactions, all the more influential [on jurors].”). Occasionally, a thoughtful juror draws back the curtain 
and reveals misunderstandings among the jury. See, e.g., NORMA THOMPSON, UNREASONABLE DOUBT: 
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND THE ART OF JUDGMENT 77, 103–05, 162–65 (2011) (describing fellow 
jurors’ reluctance to judge, resulting in a hung jury in a murder trial). 
 55 The Anti-Federalists occasionally mentioned the right to bear arms. See The Address and Reasons 
of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention, of the State of Pennsylvania, to Their Constituents (Dec. 
18, 1787), in PA. PACKET & DAILY ADVERTISER, reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST: WRITINGS BY THE 
OPPONENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION 201, 207 (Herbert J. Strong ed., 1985) (“That the people have a right 
to bear arms for the defence of themselves and their own state, or the United States, or for the purpose of 
killing game, and no law shall be passed for disarming the people or any of them . . . .”). In the Federalist 
Papers, Hamilton, Madison, and Jay did not discuss the right to bear arms directly. The issue attracted so 
little controversy presumably because in the United States, the free population was already heavily armed. 
Recall that Americans had recently fought a war of independence with large participation by citizen 
militias and soldiers, that many persons ate game meat, and that in many areas firearms were needed to 
protect against attacks by persons and wild animals. On the other hand, the issues of a standing army and 
of the relationship between the state militias and the federal government were controversial. See THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 29, at 140–42 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., Gideon 
ed. 2001). 
 56 Lerner, supra note 48, at 23–25. 
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creditors, especially foreign creditors.57 On the other hand, the Federalists 
worried that civil jurors’ anti-foreign bias would discourage the investment 
that the new Republic so badly needed for economic development. And they 
were concerned that state civil juries’ decisions in maritime and prize cases 
would upset the foreign relations of the new nation, and could even lead to 
war.58 Anti-Federalist Patrick Henry and Federalist James Madison argued 
about these issues in the Virginia ratifying convention.59 
In Federalist No. 83, Alexander Hamilton explained why a 
constitutional right to civil jury trial was a bad idea. Juries would often need 
radical simplification of disputes, and some disputes were simply too 
complicated to subject to this treatment.60 Jurors were not learned in the law, 
and thus apt to make mistakes in delicate cases, especially ones involving 
foreigners.61 And such a right would be difficult to draft. The federal courts 
had no existing jury practice, and the states all had different practices 
concerning when a jury was required.62 
At the end of Federalist No. 83, Hamilton issued a strong warning 
against constitutionalizing a right to civil jury trial. Particularly concerning 
the civil jury, he explained, there was need for flexibility to accommodate 
“the changes which are continually happening in the affairs of society.”63 
England, as well as the American states, had reduced the use of civil jury 
trial, which suggested that its previous extent had been “found 
inconvenient.”64 There was reason to suspect, he wrote, that this process of 
limiting the use of juries would continue. In fact, even states that had 
constitutional provisions guaranteeing jury trial had been busily limiting it. 
In the case of civil jury trial, Hamilton wrote, “I suspect it to be impossible 
in the nature of the thing, to fix the salutary point at which the operation of 
the institution ought to stop; and this is with me a strong argument for leaving 
the matter to the discretion of the legislature.”65 It was better to rely on the 
structure of government for permanent effects, rather than particular rights. 
 
 57 Lerner, supra note 4, at 826–27; Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh 
Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 675–76 (1973); Matthew P. Harrington, The Economic Origins of 
the Seventh Amendment, 87 IOWA L. REV. 145, 172–74 (2001).  
 58 ANTHONY J. BELLIA JR. & BRADFORD R. CLARK, THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 121–24 (2017); Wolfram, supra note 57, at 678; Harrington, supra note 57, at 174–79; 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 437. 
 59 Lerner, supra note 4, at 827–28 & n.99. 
 60 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 438. 
 61 Id. at 437. 
 62 Id. at 435–36. 
 63 Id. at 441. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
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“Particular provisions, though not altogether useless, have far less virtue and 
efficacy than are commonly ascribed to them . . . .”66 Hamilton’s warning 
proved to be correct. Civil jury trials are now exceedingly rare. 
But the Anti-Federalists ignored Hamilton’s warnings about piecemeal 
rights and insisted on a constitutional right to civil jury trial. To avoid what 
he saw as a real danger of a second constitutional convention, James 
Madison drafted a series of Amendments to the new Constitution that 
included a right to civil jury trial, in what became the Seventh Amendment.67 
The very thing Hamilton warned about came to pass. The civil jury, 
with all its poor incentives and lack of comprehension, became embedded in 
the U.S. Constitution. As I explain in Section II.D, constitutionalizing such 
a procedure continues to distort the legal system. 
II. SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS VERSUS PROCEDURAL RIGHTS 
The second major contrast between the Second Amendment and the 
Seventh concerns the difference between substantive and procedural rights. 
Substantive rights have a core that can be meaningfully interpreted and 
protected. They can exist independently of a particular government or a 
particular legal system. Procedural rights do not have such a core because 
they are necessarily embedded in a whole system of legal procedure and 
depend on that system for their meaning. I will explain this in more detail, 
but first, some definitions are in order. 
A. Definitions of Substance and Procedure 
For purposes of this argument, what is a substantive or a procedural 
right? The meaning of the terms “substance” and “procedure” are not always 
obvious. The line can be blurry. In the memorable words of Representative 
John Dingell of Michigan, who served several stints as chairman of the 
House Energy and Commerce Committee: “If I let you write the substance 
and you let me write the procedure, I’ll screw you every time.”68 As Dingell’s 
statement suggests, rules that seem to be procedural can have a dispositive 
effect on enforcing substantive rules. But this does not mean that there can 
be no line drawn between substance and procedure—or that such a line 
would not be useful. 
Legal categories, like most other sorts of categories, are not absolute. 
But drawing lines is still helpful and necessary. There are two points worth 
 
 66 Id. at 442. 
 67 Wolfram, supra note 57, at 725–26; Harrington, supra note 57, at 222, 227. 
 68 Cristina Marcos, Former Rep. John Dingell Dies at 92, HILL (Feb. 7, 2019, 9:08  
PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/house/428805-former-rep-john-dingell-dies-at-92 [https://perma.cc/ 
2PLK-2VDB]. Thanks to Alice Ristroph for reminding me of the importance of Dingell’s words. 
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keeping in mind about line-drawing between categories. First, there will 
always be some degree of arbitrariness in drawing the line. A helpful analogy 
is to the difference between a child and an adult.69 At some point, a child 
becomes an adult. But where exactly that line is drawn will always be 
somewhat arbitrary. Still, the distinction is necessary and important. 
Second, the line between categories may be drawn in different places 
for different purposes. For example, the line between a child and an adult is 
drawn in different places for purposes of marriage, validity of contracts, 
buying alcohol, voting, possessing criminal intent, and criminal procedure 
and sentencing. The words “child” and “adult” do not have the same meaning 
in all legal contexts. 
Likewise, with respect to the line between substance and procedure, 
there will always be some degree of arbitrariness in hard cases. And the line 
may, and should, be drawn in different places depending on the purpose of 
the divide. 
Conflict of laws, for example, asks courts to draw a line because a 
forum court applies its own procedural rules, but may apply the substantive 
law of another jurisdiction. In this case, a major goal of the line-drawing is 
to ensure uniformity of result across jurisdictions.70 The idea is that the 
outcome of the case should be the same, no matter where the case is filed. 
This makes litigation more predictable. But it would be too burdensome to 
ask courts to apply every detail of another jurisdiction’s practice. The test 
follows the goal. For conflict of laws, many courts use the test of the 
convenience of the forum.71 Courts using this test ask: How hard is it to 
determine the law of another state, and is that law likely to affect the outcome 
of the case? 
But here, we are not dealing with conflict of laws. The issue is about 
differences between constitutional provisions. The line between substance 
and procedure for this purpose need not be the same as the line used for other 
purposes.  
 
 69 This analogy comes from Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of 
Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 356 (1933); see also Frederick Schauer, Second-Order Vagueness in the Law, 
in VAGUENESS AND LAW: PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 177 (Geert Keil & Ralf Poscher 
eds., 2016) (discussing the second layer of vagueness often seen in legal interpretations where it is unclear 
which legal term is the operative and vague one). 
 70 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, at viii–ix (AM. L. INST. 1934) (citing, in the introduction, 
the purpose of the Restatement as “certainty and clarity”); see also William M. Richman & David Riley, 
The First Restatement of Conflict of Laws on the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Its Successor: 
Contemporary Practice in Traditional Courts, 56 MD. L. REV. 1196, 1200 (1997) (describing 
predictability and forum neutrality as “vaunted virtues” of the first Restatement). 
 71 See Cook, supra note 69, at 343–44; Janeen M. Carruthers, Substance and Procedure in the 
Conflict of Laws: A Continuing Debate in Relation to Damages, 53 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 691, 692–93 
(2004). 
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For purposes of the Constitution, the distinction between substance and 
procedure is important to the rule of law.72 Substantive rules govern primary 
conduct outside litigation. That primary conduct may be either the citizen’s 
or the government’s. Clear substantive rules provide better guidance about 
what conduct is permitted and what is not. They improve knowledge of the 
law, and predictability of the system. 
Procedural rules, by contrast, regulate the means by which government 
adjudicates certain disputes. Separate rules of procedure allow the procedural 
system to focus more precisely on efficiency and accuracy of adjudication. 
Again, this enhances knowledge of consequences and predictability. 
For this purpose, an “outcome-determinative” test is not helpful to 
distinguish substantive rules from procedural rules. In many civil cases, the 
use of a jury—as opposed to adjudication by a judge—may indeed be 
outcome determinative, especially as to damages. Under such a test, the civil 
jury might therefore be considered substantive. But use of civil juries is a 
means of adjudication in litigation that should not affect primary conduct. 
Another way to put this distinction is that the civil jury trial is a right that 
only applies to litigants. The right to keep and bear arms is not. It directly 
concerns primary conduct outside the judicial system. 
Not everything in the U.S. Constitution is a substantive or procedural 
right. In fact, most provisions of the Constitution are neither. Generally 
speaking, in a constitution there are three types of provisions: structural 
provisions, substantive rights, and procedural rights. The vast majority of the 
provisions of the U.S. Constitution are structural provisions; they set out the 
rules for establishing and running the federal government and its relations to 
the states and to foreign powers. In setting out the structure of the federal 
government, the Constitution creates an entire system, and carefully 
calibrates its various parts. These rules are what Professor Friedrich Hayek 
called “rules of organization” for a government.73 
Substantive and procedural rights are not structural in this sense. 
Substantive rights may indeed express the main purpose of the government. 
In classical liberal thought, the main purpose of government is to secure 
liberty and property.74 The structure and operation of the federal government 
were designed to further these goals. Some provisions of the first eight 
 
 72 On this point, I am grateful for discussions with Darrell Miller. 
 73 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 124–25 (1973). 
 74 John Locke declared that each person, and by extension government, “may not, unless it be to do 
justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the 
liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.” JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 198 (A. 
Millar et al. eds., London 1764) (1689). This is an expression of the idea of a natural right in life, liberty, 
and property that Jefferson changed to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” in the Declaration of 
Independence. 
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Amendments of the U.S. Constitution state these goals explicitly. But they 
are not in themselves part of the structure of government, which is why many 
Federalists thought that they were unnecessary.75 
To elaborate further on the distinction between substantive and 
procedural rights, a “substantive” right does not purport to require a 
particular procedure in the legal system, and it is compatible with a variety 
of possible legal systems, including adversarial and inquisitorial systems. In 
contrast, a specific “procedural” right attempts to ensure the availability of a 
particular practice to an individual in a legal proceeding, or to require a 
government official in a legal proceeding to follow a particular practice. 
These provisions are not compatible with a wide variety of legal systems. 
They shape a legal system. 
Applying this distinction between substance and procedure, here is a 
Table setting out the division among the provisions of the first eight 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution: 
  
 
 75 THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 445 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan 
eds., Gideon ed. 2001) (declaring that bills of rights “are not only unnecessary in the proposed 
constitution, but would even be dangerous”). 
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TABLE: DIVISION AMONG THE PROVISIONS OF THE FIRST EIGHT AMENDMENTS TO THE 
U.S. CONSTITUTION 
 Substantive Procedural 
First Amendment 
Prohibition on 
establishment of religion; 
free exercise of religion; 
freedoms of speech, the 
press, assembly, and 
petition 
 
Second Amendment Right to keep and bear arms  
Third Amendment 




Prohibition on unreasonable 
searches and seizures 
Requirements for obtaining 
a warrant 
Fifth Amendment 
Compensation for takings 
of private property for 
public use 
Grand jury; prohibition on 
double jeopardy; privilege 
against self-incrimination; 
due process 
Sixth Amendment  
Speedy and public trial; 
criminal jury trial; 
information about 
accusation; confrontation 
with adverse witnesses; 
compulsory process to 
obtain defense witnesses; 
defense counsel 
Seventh Amendment  
Civil jury trial; prohibition 
on reexamination of facts 
Eighth Amendment 
Prohibition on excessive 
fines, and cruel and unusual 
punishments 
Prohibition on excessive 
bail 
 
Some classifications in this Table may seem surprising. Therefore, 
three special notes are in order. First, the Eighth Amendment bans on 
excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishments are classified as 
substantive rights. The punishment that may be imposed for crime has 
traditionally, and rightly, been understood as part of substantive criminal 
law, not procedure. A sign of this is that specific punishments for crimes are 
not traditionally included in codes of criminal procedure. The punishment is 
typically specified at the same time the substantive offense is created. (In 
contrast, the method of sentencing is procedural.) 
Second, freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, the first 
clause of the Fourth Amendment, is a substantive right. It is compatible with 
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a variety of possible legal systems. But, to a large extent, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has transformed that substantive right into a procedural right. This 
happened in the decision to constitutionally require the exclusionary rule.76 
Instead of the focus being on the substantive right—was a search or seizure 
unreasonable?—the focus is on whether evidence will be excluded from a 
criminal trial. Justice John Marshall Harlan II pointed this out in his dissent 
in Mapp v. Ohio.77 As commentators have observed, this judicially created 
procedural right has led to many problems.78 Fortunately the Fourth 
Amendment, being fundamentally a substantive right, has a core that can be 
maintained. The U.S. Supreme Court has been slowly peeling away the 
procedural right of exclusion,79 so there is hope for a more substantive 
emphasis. 
Third, the Fifth Amendment right of due process is unusual among the 
procedural rights in that it is general and in theory compatible with a variety 
of legal systems. As I explain in the Conclusion, it is not subject to the same 
criticisms as the more specific procedural rights. 
B. The Importance of the Distinction Between Substance and Procedure 
As I discussed above, the distinction between substance and procedure 
is important to the rule of law. Clear substantive rules provide better 
guidance about what conduct is permitted and what is not. They improve 
knowledge of the law and predictability of the system. Separate rules of 
procedure allow the procedural system to focus more precisely on efficiency 
and accuracy of adjudication. 
 
 76 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
 77 Id. at 683–85 (Harlan, J., dissenting). “In my view this Court should continue to forbear from 
fettering the States with an adamant rule which may embarrass them in coping with their own peculiar 
problems in criminal law enforcement.” Id. at 681. 
 78 There are many alternatives to exclusion of evidence as a remedy for Fourth Amendment 
violations, including civil suits (the traditional common law remedy), internal discipline of police, and 
criminal prosecution of police. Professor Akhil Amar has given some of the most trenchant criticism of 
the exclusionary rule and creative exploration of the alternatives. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment 
First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 797–99 (1994). As he and others have pointed out, the 
requirement of exclusion in a criminal case has narrowed the substantive scope of the Fourth Amendment. 
See id. at 769. Seeing a parade of guilty persons before them trying to exclude evidence has made courts 
reluctant to extend the substantive right. Courts have created endless exceptions to the exclusionary rule, 
making the law uncertain. See id. at 799. And exclusion provides no direct remedy for the innocent. But 
legislators sit back and relax, comfortable in the belief that the courts have taken care of remedies for 
Fourth Amendment violations. The procedural right has stifled innovation in remedies for search and 
seizure violations. Once again, a procedural right has arguably created more problems than it has solved. 
 79 See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 136–37 (2009) (holding that the exclusionary 
rule does not apply in situations in which illegal search or seizure is only the result of police negligence, 
as exclusion for negligence would not further the exclusionary rule’s goal of deterring wrongful police 
conduct). 
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As legal systems grow in sophistication, they increasingly separate 
substance and procedure. They separate the rules of primary conduct from 
the machinery for enforcing those rules. Political entities adopting the civil 
law (Roman-canon) systems separated the two earlier than the common law. 
Examples were the early codes of procedure such as the Carolina, issued for 
the Holy Roman Empire in 1532.80 
In the common law, the writ system made it difficult to separate 
substance from procedure. Each writ was a substantive cause of action, but 
contained its own mini-code of procedure—including method of summons, 
adjudication, and remedy.81 It was only when the writ system was starting to 
decay—by the time of William Blackstone in the mid-eighteenth century—
that a distinction between substance and procedure became more visible. 
Hence, Blackstone organized his Commentaries by the relatively modern 
categories of substantive law and procedure, rather than by writ, as most 
common law writers had done before him.82 
But the word “procedure” was not generally used in the United States 
or England until the early nineteenth century.83 Use of the word marked an 
increasing separation between substance and procedure. Courts recognized 
that procedure should be more flexible. Early-nineteenth-century courts were 
more willing to change procedural rules (“rules of practice”) than substantive 
rules because substantive rules affected primary conduct. Courts tended to 
hold that procedural changes operated retroactively, whereas changes to 
substantive laws did not.84 Increasingly, efficiency and accuracy of 
adjudication were thought of as the primary goals of a procedural system.85 
Problems arise when a legal system tries to create a procedural fix for a 
substantive issue. This is exactly what Dingell’s comment is about.86 English 
 
 80 See generally CONSTITUTIO CRIMINALIS CAROLINA (1532). For further information about the 
Carolina, and an English translation, see JOHN H. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE: 
ENGLAND, GERMANY, FRANCE 261–308 (1974). For a comparative account of the development of the 
distinction between substance and procedure, see Charles Donahue Jr., “The Hypostasis of a Prophecy”: 
Legal Realism and Legal History, in LAW AND LEGAL PROCESS: SUBSTANTIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE IN 
ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 12–16 (Matthew Dyson & David Ibbetson eds., 2013). 
 81 JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENÉE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON 
LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 87–97 (2009). 
 82 Id. at 840–41. 
 83 See AMALIA D. KESSLER, INVENTING AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN 
ADVERSARIAL LEGAL CULTURE, 1800-1877, at 10–12 (2017); Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Writs to Rights: 
“Navigability” and the Transformation of the Common Law in the Nineteenth Century, 23 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1049, 1050–54 (2002). 
 84 See Cook, supra note 69, at 341–43. 
 85 See Lerner, supra note 4, at 828–31 (“Americans in all areas were concerned with regional and 
national economic development. Predictable, uniform legal rules helped promote that development.”). 
 86 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
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common law judges were well versed in creating procedural solutions for 
substantive problems. They were proto-Dingells. The best example is 
Bushell’s Case in 1670, already referred to as eliminating jury accountability 
for verdicts.87 At the time, there was a substantive problem with English law. 
There were no substantive rights to free speech or free exercise of religion. 
Parliament enacted laws restricting speech and religion, including the 
Conventicles Acts, making it a crime to participate in a Quaker meeting. Yet, 
a significant portion of the population favored some measure of these 
freedoms. What to do? 
In Bushell’s Case, matters came to a head when William Penn, the 
founder of Pennsylvania, and William Mead were caught participating in a 
Quaker meeting. There was no doubt whatsoever of their guilt; the pair 
openly preached Quakerism. A criminal jury acquitted them of violating the 
Conventicles Acts. A lack of substantive rights led to jury nullification. 
Faced with the question of whether to discipline the jurors by the usual 
means of fining or imprisoning, the English judges declined. By this 
decision, they tacitly permitted jury nullification. Instead of urging 
Parliament to declare a substantive right to free exercise of religion, or at 
least to repeal the Conventicles Acts, the judges preferred the procedural 
method of relying on juries to decide the question. 
Many persons consider Bushell’s Case to be a glorious triumph of 
liberty. The Fully Informed Jury Association has declared September fifth to 
be “Jury Rights Day” because it is the anniversary of William Penn’s arrest 
for violating the Conventicles Acts.88 But relying on a procedural fix for a 
substantive problem comes with a cost. It is by no means certain whether a 
jury will uphold a substantive liberty in a particular case by nullifying the 
law. It can also be hard to predict the results of other procedures, if they are 
being used to try to get certain substantive outcomes. The law becomes 
unpredictable. Persons cannot have reasonable certainty about the 
consequences of their actions. 
Lack of jury accountability blurs the line between substance and 
procedure. In effect, jurors make law, and they are allowed to do so because 
they cannot be held accountable. The two major points of this Essay—about 
accountability and the difference between substance and procedure—are 
connected. 
 
 87 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. The following account of Bushell’s Case is drawn from 
LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 81, at 423–31. 
 88 Jury Rights Day, FULLY INFORMED JURY ASS’N, https://fija.org/what-we-do/jury-rights-day/jury-
rights-day-2020.html [https://perma.cc/48LM-JJLY]. 
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C. Procedural Rights Not Compatible with All Legal Systems: The 
Problem of Incorporation 
It’s important to observe that, unlike substantive provisions, specific 
procedural provisions are not compatible with a wide variety of legal 
systems. Many are deeply incompatible. These provisions can put a 
straitjacket on procedure, preventing important reform. This was why 
Hamilton recommended leaving the scope of civil jury trial to legislatures. 
The problem of blocking reform provoked struggles on the U.S. Supreme 
Court over the issue of incorporating procedural rights against the states. 
As an example of incompatibility with different systems, the 
independent jury has proven to be deeply incompatible with civil law, or 
inquisitorial, systems.89 By independent jury, I mean groups composed 
purely of laypeople who deliberate and make adjudicatory decisions apart 
from professional judges. The independent jury is at odds with the goals of 
reasoned decision-making and full appeal that are so important to civil law 
systems. In particular, the use of civil juries is so alien to civil law systems 
that almost none of them have adopted it. Inquisitorial systems have tried to 
adopt the independent jury for criminal cases, and it has failed. Germany, 
Italy, and France, for example, abandoned the independent jury in favor of a 
mixed panel of professional judges and lay jurors.90 In theory, Spain and 
Russia today have independent criminal juries for serious cases. But in 
practice, judges and lawyers in those countries have greatly diminished jury 
trial, by prosecutors undercharging and courts using abbreviated 
procedures.91 
And we should not forget that, in practice, U.S. systems have also 
virtually eliminated jury trials in favor of settlements and plea bargains. I 
discuss this phenomenon respecting civil juries in Section II.D.1. In effect, 
the independent jury has also proven to be incompatible with our system as 
it has developed. For example, the scope and function of criminal jury trial 
changed hugely once prosecutors routinely started offering, and judges 
 
 89 The modern jury arose in the middle ages in England and did not exist in civil law systems until 
the French revolution—1792, to be precise. LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 81, at 54–64; JAMES 
M. DONOVAN, JURIES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN FRANCE IN THE NINETEENTH 
& TWENTIETH CENTURIES 27, 34 (2010). 
 90 See Gerhard Casper & Hans Zeisel, Lay Judges in the German Criminal Courts, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 
135, 135–43 (1972); Claudia Passarella, From Scandalous Verdicts to “Suicidal Sentences”: The Reform 
of the Courts of Assize Under the Fascist Regime, 80 STUDIA IURIDICA 251, 254 (2019); DONOVAN, supra 
note 89, at 19–20. 
 91 See Stephen C. Thaman, Europe’s New Jury Systems: The Cases of Spain and Russia, 62 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 245–46 (1999); Máximo Langer, Plea Bargaining, Conviction Without Trial, and 
the Global Administratization of Criminal Convictions, 4 ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY 377, 397 (2021) 
(estimating a plea bargaining rate of eighty-three percent in Russia); id. at 43–44 (Supp.) (explaining that 
rates of plea bargaining, “conformidad,” have been increasing in Spain in recent decades). 
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routinely accepted, deals with defendants for lesser charges or sentences in 
exchange for guilty pleas. In the late eighteenth century, judges strenuously 
discouraged felony defendants from pleading guilty and almost always 
succeeded.92 The judges wanted to hear any evidence in mitigation of the 
sentence. Jury trial back then meant an extremely streamlined, almost 
summary proceeding.93 But jury trials grew longer, more expensive, and 
more unpredictable. Today, in the federal system, over ninety-seven percent 
of criminal convictions are the result of a guilty plea, with no jury trial.94 
Criminal jury trial is vanishingly rare. 
In other common law countries as well, the civil jury has been virtually 
eliminated. Those legal systems developed independent and reasonably 
competent judiciaries, with strong powers to comment on the evidence 
presented to the jury. In the vast majority of civil cases, jury verdicts agreed 
with the opinion of the judge. Under the circumstances, the legal profession 
and members of the general public thought that the use of civil juries was an 
unnecessary expense and delay.95 Hamilton was right. The trend in favor of 
limiting civil juries continued. The U.S. constitutional right has become 
hollow. 
I could go on through the other procedural rights. Grand juries, and the 
requirement of indictment, have been abolished in England.96 In the United 
States, about half the states do not require grand jury indictment.97 Today, 
even in the federal system, grand jury indictment is being displaced by the 
growing practice of prosecutors to offer plea deals before indictment.98 
Like the independent jury, double jeopardy, with jeopardy attaching 
early in the proceedings, is incompatible with the civil law systems. Those 
systems recognize that errors can be made by acquitting as well as by 
convicting, and that these errors should be corrected on appeal.99 Civil law 
systems do not try to protect jury nullification, as our system does. 
 
 92 LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 81, at 601–02. 
 93 See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 16–20 (2003); LANGBEIN, 
LERNER, & SMITH, supra note 81, at 599–602. 
 94 Of federal offenders sentenced in 2019, 97.6% pled guilty. CHARLES R. BREYER, DANNY C. 
REEVES, PATRICIA K. CUSHWA & DAVID RYBICKI, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT AND 
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 56 tbl.11 (2019). 
 95 See Conor Hanly, The Decline of Civil Jury Trial in Nineteenth-Century England, 26 J. LEGAL 
HIST. 253, 259–60 (2005). 
 96 PATRICK DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 10 (1960); LANGBEIN, LERNER & 
SMITH, supra note 81, at 707–08. 
 97 LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 81, at 750. 
 98 For a jurisdictional criticism of this practice, see Roger A. Fairfax Jr., The Jurisdictional Heritage 
of the Grand Jury Clause, 91 MINN. L. REV. 398, 400–01 (2006). 
 99 John H. Langbein, Mixed Court and Jury Court: Could the Continental Alternative Fill the 
American Need?, 1981 AM. BAR FOUND. RSCH. J. 195, 200, 213–14 (1981). 
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The struggles over incorporation of federal constitutional provisions 
against the states reflect these difficulties with procedural rights. Early on, 
the federal courts shut down any notion of applying the first eight 
Amendments to the states, as explained in Chief Justice John Marshall’s 
1833 opinion in Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore.100 After ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, the question became more acute. The U.S. 
Supreme Court first incorporated substantive rights. Although initially the 
Court refused to apply the substantive provisions against the states,101 later it 
did so. In 1897, the Court applied the Takings Clause against the states, and 
in 1925, the free speech and free press rights of the First Amendment.102 
But the procedural provisions long resisted incorporation.103 Some 
Justices, especially Benjamin Cardozo, Felix Frankfurter, and the younger 
John Harlan, understood that the states needed flexibility to develop effective 
systems of adjudication. In Palko v. Connecticut in 1937, for example, 
Justice Cardozo wrote for the Court refusing to incorporate the Double 
Jeopardy Clause against the states.104 Connecticut allowed the prosecution to 
appeal an acquittal. Although he did not use the terms, Justice Cardozo drew 
a significant distinction between substantive rights and most procedural 
rights. Describing “freedom of thought, and speech,” he wrote, “Of that 
freedom one may say that it is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of 
nearly every other form of freedom.”105 Therefore it was properly applied 
against the states. On the other hand, the rights to jury trial and grand jury 
indictment, the prohibition against double jeopardy, and the privilege against 
self-incrimination “are not of the very essence of a scheme of ordered 
liberty. . . . Few would be so narrow or provincial as to maintain that a fair 
and enlightened system of justice would be impossible without them.”106 
Justice Cardozo took an informed comparative view, one that allowed the 
states flexibility. 
Likewise, in Wolf v. Colorado in 1949, Justice Frankfurter wrote the 
Court’s opinion incorporating the substantive Fourth Amendment right to be 
 
 100 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 243 (1833). 
 101 See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 542 (1875) (refusing to apply First and 
Second Amendment protections against the states). 
 102 Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 226 (1897); Gitlow v. New York, 
268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
 103 See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (declining to incorporate the Fifth 
Amendment requirement of grand jury indictment against the states); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 
78 (1908) (declining to incorporate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination against the 
states). 
 104 302 U.S. 319, 319–20 (1937). 
 105 Id. at 326–27. 
 106 Id. at 325. 
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free from unreasonable governmental searches and seizures.107 He declared 
that right to be “basic to a free society.”108 But he refused to incorporate the 
procedural exclusionary rule that the Court had developed for the federal 
courts. Applying Justice Cardozo’s test of whether a right is “implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty,” Justice Frankfurter explained, “the ways of 
enforcing such a basic right raise questions of a different order.”109 The 
methods of checking violations, the remedies for violations, and the means 
of enforcing those remedies “are all questions that are not to be so 
dogmatically answered as to preclude the varying solutions which spring 
from an allowable range of judgment.”110 Again, flexibility was to be 
permitted to the states on matters of procedure. 
And in Duncan v. Louisiana in 1968, Justice Harlan vigorously argued 
in dissent against incorporating the criminal jury right: “The States have 
always borne primary responsibility for operating the machinery of criminal 
justice within their borders, and adapting it to their particular 
circumstances.”111 Interfering with state procedure through incorporation of 
federal constitutional provisions was a mistake: “[N]either history, nor sense, 
supports using the Fourteenth Amendment to put the States in a 
constitutional straitjacket with respect to their own development in the 
administration of criminal or civil law.”112 
Unfortunately, Justice Harlan was fighting a losing battle. By 1968, the 
Court was launched on its procedural rights revolution. Justice Byron White 
wrote for the Court in Duncan, incorporating the right to criminal jury trial 
against the states. In the process, Justice White came up with a test for 
incorporation—whether a particular right is “necessary to an Anglo-
American regime of ordered liberty”—which he buried in a footnote.113 The 
test was disingenuous because it did not explain the cases at all, though 
Justice White claimed it did. Recently created procedural rights unknown in 
England were said to meet this test.114 As this discussion shows, such a test 
would be unworkable in any event. The “Anglo-American” regimes of 
“ordered liberty”—that is, procedural systems—were constantly changing, 
in important ways. 
 
 107 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949). 
 108 Id. at 27. 
 109 Id. at 28. 
 110 Id. 
 111 391 U.S. 145, 172 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 112 Id. at 175–76. 
 113 Id. at 149 n.14 (opinion for the Court). 
 114 Id. (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), as 
two examples). 
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Most likely, what was really behind Duncan and many other 1960s 
cases was concern about the treatment of Black defendants.115 The 
constitutional procedural rights revolution was essentially part of the Civil 
Rights Movement, and importantly linked to the Cold War.116 The United 
States could hardly claim to be a beacon of liberty for the free world if it 
treated Black defendants badly. 
But insisting on certain procedural rights turned out to be a terrible way 
to address that concern. The good intentions of the Justices backfired, 
because they ignored the law of unintended consequences. The result has 
been the denial of any form of adjudication.117 Hundreds of thousands of 
Black men—and others—have gone to prison through plea bargains, without 
any adjudication at all.118 Procedural rights have failed utterly. Not only have 
they failed to improve procedures for defendants; they have made things 
worse. 
Despite its criminal procedure binge, even now, the U.S. Supreme 
Court is reluctant to incorporate all procedural rights against the states. The 
rights to grand jury indictment and to civil jury trial have not been 
incorporated.119 Not coincidentally, those are the types of juries that have 
been virtually abolished in the rest of the common law world. At least to 
some extent, the federal courts seem to have understood that procedure needs 
to be flexible, to adjust. 
The perceived need for legal institutions and procedures changes 
dramatically over time. And so does their function. On this central point, as 
well as the more specific point about the civil jury, Hamilton was right.120 
D. The Terminal Decay of the Seventh Amendment 
A particular legal procedure is necessarily one part of an entire legal 
system. The scope and function of any particular procedure can change 
dramatically depending on changes in the surrounding legal system. We have 
seen that with respect to criminal jury trial.121 The same is true of civil jury 
trial. 
 
 115 Duncan was a Black nineteen-year-old accused of assaulting a white boy. Id. at 147. 
 116 On the connection between the Civil Rights Movement and the Cold War, see MARY L. DUDZIAK, 
COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 4–17 (2000). 
 117 On the importance of adjudication in criminal cases, see Langbein, supra note 8. 
 118 See PIZZI, supra note 7, at 24 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s criminal procedure revolution 
has led to soaring rates of plea bargaining, and thus incarceration). 
 119 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534–35 (1884) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment 
does not require indictment by a grand jury); Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 
211, 216, 223 (1916) (holding that civil jury trials are not required in state actions). 
 120 See supra Section I.B.3. 
 121 See supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text. 
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1. The Vanishing Civil Jury 
The scope and function of civil jury trial has also changed tremendously 
over time, because of changes in the surrounding legal system. Elaborate 
pretrial discovery, rising cost of litigation, permissive joinder of claims and 
parties, consolidation of cases into class actions and multidistrict litigation, 
lengthy jury selection, ever more complicated claims, an explosion of 
scientific and statistical evidence, summary judgment procedure—all these 
and more have taken a toll on civil jury trial.122 The greatest fear of counsel 
seems to be the unpredictability of civil jury verdicts, especially as to 
damages.123 Currently, fewer than one percent of civil cases reaching 
disposition in federal court are decided by jury trial.124 And yet, the Seventh 
Amendment states, “In Suits at common law . . . the right of trial by jury 
shall be preserved.”125 
It turns out that truly preserving a right to civil jury trial would require 
preserving much of a late-eighteenth-century legal system that is now 
superseded. Do we really want to go back? Do we want to eliminate 
summary judgment, as one proponent of civil juries has suggested?126 And 
pretrial discovery, and a host of other features of the modern legal system? 
The Seventh Amendment, by its language, “preserved,” seems to 
demand a historical test—that is, an originalist method of interpretation. The 
U.S. Supreme Court has consistently purported to use a historical test in 
interpreting it. But even so, real preservation has proved impossible. The 
surrounding legal system has changed too much.127 
 
 122 See generally John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE 
L.J. 522 (2012) (examining the movement away from civil jury trial). 
 123 In a 2016 survey, 936 lawyers gave as their top three reasons why jury-eligible cases did not go 
to jury trial: (1) “Parties reached a mutually agreeable settlement”; (2) “Uncertainty of jury decision-
making on damages”; and (3) “Uncertainty of jury decision-making on liability.” AM. SOC’Y TRIAL 
CONSULTANTS & CIV. JURY PROJECT AT NYU SCH. L., SUMMARIZED RESULTS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS, 2016 ATTORNEY SURVEY: DECLINING CIVIL JURY TRIALS 4, 16 (2016), 
https://civiljuryproject.law.nyu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/ASTC-CJP-Attorney-Survey-Report-
2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/D26S-DR5L]. 
 124 Today, of federal civil cases reaching disposition after court action, jury trial occurred in 0.59%. 
U.S. CTS., TABLE C-4: U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CIVIL CASES TERMINATED, BY NATURE OF SUIT AND 
ACTION TAKEN, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING MARCH 31, 2020 (2020), https://www. 
uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-4/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics/2020/03/31 [https://perma.cc/Q555-
5R28] (reporting 1,443 civil jury trials out of 244,812 total dispositions after court action). 
 125 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 126 See Suja A. Thomas, Essay, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 
142 (2007). 
 127 To take one example: In 1913, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to allow judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict in federal courts because of the Seventh Amendment’s Re-Examination Clause. But in 1935, 
the Court permitted a work-around: federal trial courts were permitted to take a jury verdict subject to the 
court’s later decision on the law. In effect, the Court was permitting judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
See Lerner, supra note 4, at 870–78. 
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Civil jury trial still exists in federal court. It occurs in a tiny number of 
cases. Professor Darrell Miller has made a valiant effort to show that “the 
Court has developed a Seventh Amendment doctrine designed to preserve 
the right to a trial by jury at common law in its essential features.”128 But civil 
litigation today would be deeply alien to someone from the eighteenth 
century. The right to civil jury trial has not been preserved in any robust 
sense of the term, as the many empty courtrooms in any courthouse attest, 
even before the COVID-19 pandemic. 
2. What a Juryless Civil Procedure Could Look Like 
Despite the scarcity of civil jury trials today, constitutional rights to jury 
trial still have a large effect on the legal system. This is for two main reasons. 
First, settlement negotiations take place “in the shadow” of the jury.129 That 
is, the result of negotiations depends partly on what the parties expect a jury 
will do. 
Second, the constitutional right to a civil jury blocks the development 
of more efficient and accurate methods of adjudication. Because of federal 
and state constitutional rights to a civil jury trial, the United States cannot 
adopt the method of civil adjudication used in civil law countries such as 
Germany. Those systems depend on a reasonably competent, impartial 
bench. Therefore, they may not be suitable for all American states or 
localities. Here are a few advantages of those systems: 
More Efficient Courtroom Proceedings 
Without juries, court hearings would speed up considerably. There 
would be no need for voir dire and the rest of jury selection, instructing the 
jury, or rules of evidence. The law of evidence is the law of jury control. We 
fear that lay juries won’t be able to handle properly certain kinds of evidence, 
and so we exclude it. (This is clear in England, which has abolished the 
hearsay rule in civil cases, because these are now decided by bench trial.130 
But England has retained the hearsay rule in criminal cases, which use 
juries.) 
Judges could come into court having reviewed written evidence from 
the parties and prepared to ask questions of witnesses that can get directly to 
the point. No juries means a more active and efficient bench. 
 
 128 Miller, supra note 1, at 859. 
 129 J.J. Prescott & Kathryn E. Spier, A Comprehensive Theory of Civil Settlement, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
59, 127 (2016). Other important factors in settlement negotiations are the expected cost of litigation and 
the parties’ tolerance of risk. Id. at 68–80. 
130 Civil Evidence Act 1995, c. 38 (U.K.); see ANDREW L-T CHOO, EVIDENCE 262–93 (6th ed. 2021). 
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Sequential Proceedings in Logical Order 
Judges could focus on different points in separate hearings, and address 
threshold questions first. If a defendant is not liable, there is no need to hear 
evidence about damages. 
Such discontinuous proceedings are not possible with lay juries. It’s not 
fair to ask lay jurors to keep coming back to court at different times. The jury 
requires trial of all issues at once, with related confusion and waste of time.131 
Focused, Effective Discovery 
Such sequential proceedings should help judges control discovery. 
Judges can order and be more active in guiding discovery on each point as it 
arises.132 Parties should no longer be able to inflict or threaten to inflict 
horrible costs on each other with little gain in knowledge of relevant facts. 
Reasoned Decision-Making 
One of the most important changes is that decisions on the merits would 
be accompanied by written opinions explaining facts found and application 
of law to facts. 
Juries do not give official reasons. The requirement that judges explain 
their reasoning to the parties and to the public, besides being more satisfying 
to the litigants, acts as a safeguard in several ways. A biased or corrupt judge 
would have a harder time justifying a bad decision. In addition, the reasoning 
of the judge or judges in the first instance could be thoroughly reviewed on 
appeal. 
Thorough Appeal 
Lastly, thorough appeals are a vital safeguard in legal systems that rely 
on judges to make decisions. Appeals in these systems are often de novo, 
with no presumption of correctness attaching to the decision below, and of 
fact as well as law.133 
 
 131 Arthur Taylor von Mehren, The Significance for Procedural Practice and Theory of the 
Concentrated Trial: Comparative Remarks, in 2 EUROPÄISCHES RECHTSDENKEN IN GESCHICHTE UND 
GEGENWART: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HELMUT COING 361, 361–65 (Norbert Horn, Klaus Luig & Alfred 
Söllner eds., 1982). 
 132 See John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 828, 
830–31 (1985); James R. Maxeiner, Legal Certainty: A European Alternative to American Legal 
Indeterminacy?, 15 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 541, 586 (2007); Ernst C. Stiefel & James R. Maxeiner, 
Civil Justice Reform in the United States—Opportunity for Learning from ‘Civilized’ European 
Procedure Instead of Continued Isolation?, 42 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 147, 158–62 (1994). 
 133 Langbein, supra note 132, at 855–57. 
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These systems are thorough in guarding against error in decisions on 
the merits. Our limited appeals are a legacy of the jury system. We try to 
control inputs, such as what evidence the jury hears or the judge’s 
instructions on law, but there is little control over outputs, that is, the 
correctness of the verdict. Judicial decisions leading to settlement, such as a 
decision in a dispute over discovery or the denial of a motion for summary 
judgment, are virtually unreviewable. The terms of settlement can almost 
never be reviewed on appeal. 
These are the many advantages we are giving up because of 
constitutional rights to civil jury trial. The civil jury does have a role to play 
in those unfortunate places where much of the judiciary is corrupt or deeply 
biased. And there is evidence to suggest that some jurors, once their service 
is over, participate slightly more in voting.134 But this second benefit is slim 
now that there are so few civil jury trials. In many places, the advantages of 
designing a juryless system seem to considerably outweigh the 
disadvantages. 
E. The Resilience of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms 
Evidence for the robustness of substantive rights, as opposed to the 
frailty of procedural rights, is that substantive rights can and have been 
resurrected. This happened with the Second Amendment, after a period of 
being moribund. But it is much less likely that a procedural right would be 
resurrected. Resuscitating a procedural right would require radical change in 
the legal system. 
Substantive rights protect certain behaviors, or protect against certain 
actions, that can occur regardless of the particular legal system. There is core 
behavior that is protected, or prohibited. There are, of course, difficulties in 
determining exactly what that protected or prohibited behavior is. Questions 
of translation are inevitable. Changes in technology, in particular, raise 
important interpretive issues. Internet blogs and social media have joined the 
printing press; texts and emails have largely taken the place of letters; we 
now have semiautomatic rifles as well as flintlock muskets and rifles. The 
scholarly literature is full of descriptions of various possible methods of 
constitutional interpretation. My point is that a substantive right has some 
meaning to interpret, to translate—a meaning that exists apart from the 
particular type of legal system. 
 
 134 This effect is modest and limited to jurors who were not politically active before. For jurors with 
“a relatively spotty voting record,” a nationwide study found an average voter turnout increase of four to 
seven percent. For jurors who were already active voters, there was no change in voting behavior. JOHN 
GASTIL, E. PIERRE DEESS, PHILIP J. WEISER & CINDY SIMMONS, THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY: HOW JURY 
DELIBERATION PROMOTES CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 48 (2010). 
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1. Potential Weaknesses of Substantive Rights 
This is not to say that substantive rights are always secure. Substantive 
rights are vulnerable too; they can be undermined. The undermining can 
happen in three main ways. One is by fundamental interpretation of the right. 
For example, if the Supreme Court had declared the Second Amendment to 
be a collective right only—that is, a right of the states—the constitutional 
right would be essentially dead. 
Second, interpretations that undermine a right can happen in more 
subtle ways, by limiting the scope of the right. To give an example, the types 
of firearms permitted can be restricted, sometimes gradually, until the 
restrictions become severe. And the persons allowed to own or carry firearms 
can also be restricted, as in the places where issuing a carry permit is up to 
the discretion of local officials. In New York City, this discretion meant that 
the rich and well-connected were issued carry permits—including Arthur 
Ochs “Punch” Sulzberger, publisher of the antigun New York Times.135 And 
in the past, some states and localities barred Black persons from owning or 
carrying firearms.136 
Finally, great burdens can be put on the exercise of the right. States or 
localities might, for instance, require payment of a $5,000 fee for a carry 
permit, or 100 hours of firearms training with a certified instructor, or a delay 
of a year before issuing a permit. Of course, lesser restrictions could also 
deter exercising the right. 
Despite these vulnerabilities, I still suggest that interpreting substantive 
rights is easier than interpreting procedural rights. Restrictions on a 
substantive right can usually be more readily identified, and their effects 
more easily understood. The effects are typically more direct. In a sense, a 
judge is investigating a narrower sphere. A judge does not have to cope with 
all the possible ramifications of rules in an entire legal system. The difficulty 
of this task in the case of procedural rights is shown by the fact that Congress 
and even judges have misunderstood the effects of their decisions. As we 
have seen, many members of the U.S. Supreme Court seemed blissfully 
unaware that with the criminal procedural rights revolution, they were 
encouraging the death of any adjudication. Likewise, the advisory committee 
for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure succeeded in hiding from Congress 
 
 135 Clayton E. Cramer & David B. Kopel, “Shall Issue”: The New Wave of Concealed Handgun 
Permit Laws, 62 TENN. L. REV. 679, 684 (1995); see Kates, infra note 149, at 208. 
 136 STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR 
ARMS, 1866-1876, at 27, 146 (1998); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, In the Civic Republic: 
Crime, the Inner City, and the Democracy of Arms—Being a Disquisition on the Revival of the Militia at 
Large, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1605, 1617 (2013). 
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the nature and effects of their radically expanded discovery provisions.137 
Many members of Congress did not appear to realize that the Federal Rules 
would result in a precipitous slide in the number of civil jury trials. 
The revival of the Second Amendment is therefore somewhat 
contingent, by no means assured of lasting. But at least it was possible. 
2. The Fall and Rise of the Second Amendment 
To understand the decline and revival of the right to keep and bear arms, 
some historical perspective is necessary. Of special importance is the history 
of crime rates and the relationship between crime rates and gun laws. Let me 
transport you back in time a little over five decades. In the late 1960s, rates 
of violent crime were skyrocketing. In large American cities, in the decade 
between 1960 and 1970, reports of robberies to the police rose over 400%.138 
Homicides nearly doubled.139 American cities, which had before been safe 
for women and children to navigate freely, even alone and at night, became 
hazardous. American urban life was transformed; crime seemed to be 
spiraling out of control. 
In an effort to stem the violence and fear, officials and legislators in 
cities and states hit upon the idea of prohibiting handguns. They got 
encouragement from former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark’s 1970 
book Crime in America.140 Clark had launched his antigun campaign while 
in office in 1967.141 The assassinations of President John Kennedy in 1963, 
and of Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert Kennedy in 1968, were an added 
spur.142 Handgun ownership, and especially carrying a gun in public, was 
forbidden for many law-abiding citizens.143 
Courts acquiesced in the new gun restrictions. Courts were not 
blameless in the rise of violent crime. The criminal procedure revolution of 
 
 137 See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered the Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 972, 996–1000 (1987). 
 138 BARRY LATZER, THE RISE AND FALL OF VIOLENT CRIME IN AMERICA 123 (2016). 
 139 Id. 
 140 RAMSEY CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA: OBSERVATIONS ON ITS NATURE, CAUSES, PREVENTION 
AND CONTROL 101–14 (1970). 
 141 STATEMENT BY ATTORNEY GENERAL RAMSEY CLARK BEFORE SUBCOMMITTEE NO. 5 OF THE 
HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 1 (1967), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/08/ 
23/03-16-1967.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KTU-TECU]. 
 142 See CLARK, supra note 140, at 110; ROBERT J. COTTROL, GUN CONTROL AND THE 
CONSTITUTION: SOURCES AND EXPLORATIONS ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT, xxix–xxx (1994). 
 143 Apart from the Black Codes, the first major law restricting handgun ownership and carry in public 
was New York’s Sullivan Law in 1911, which was aimed at the large immigrant populations in New York 
City. STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS: A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OR 
A PRIVILEGE OF THE RULING CLASS? 303–09 (2021); COTTROL, supra note 142, at xxv. Other states and 
cities followed New York, with the trend accelerating in the 1970s and early 1980s. DAVID HARSANYI, 
FIRST FREEDOM: A RIDE THROUGH AMERICA’S ENDURING HISTORY WITH THE GUN 226, 230–31 (2018). 
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the 1960s increased the costs and uncertainties of accurately investigating 
crimes, arresting offenders, trying them, and punishing them.144 The novel 
judicial requirements burdened criminal justice systems and lowered 
deterrence, just at the time those systems needed to be more efficient and 
deterring.145 Crime clearance rates and conviction rates of defendants both 
fell, just as crime was soaring.146 The evidence suggests that both the police 
and courts were overwhelmed.147 Courts put up no resistance to gun 
restrictions.148 Focusing on guns conveniently deflected attention from the 
effects of courts’ decisions on criminal procedure. Meanwhile, legal scholars 
almost wholly ignored the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, 
except to dismiss it as a collective right, to be curtailed at the states’ or the 
federal government’s pleasure.149 
The expectations of Clark and other proponents of gun restrictions were 
disappointed. Despite the gun laws, violent crime did not fall; it rose—
substantially. From 1970 to 1980, homicide rates in the largest American 
cities rose from 18.4 per 100,000 population to 29.4.150 As the Italian 
criminologist Cesare Beccaria explained two and a half centuries ago, gun 
prohibitions only disarm law-abiding persons. Someone who is willing to 
commit armed robbery or murder is not likely to obey laws prohibiting 
guns.151 As a result of gun restrictions, criminals had an easier time wreaking 
 
 144 Among these decisions were Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (finding that the exclusionary 
rule is binding on states); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (holding that warrantless searches 
of a suspect are limited to the suspect and the area within the suspect’s reach); Griffin v. California, 
380 U.S. 609 (1965) (finding that a jury instruction inferring guilt from a defendant‘s invocation of the 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was unconstitutional); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 
145 (1968) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial applies to the states); and Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (finding that the Fifth Amendment requires that law enforcement officials 
advise suspects of their right to remain silent and to obtain an attorney during interrogations in police 
custody). 
 145 Professor William Pizzi describes the deleterious effects of several of the Supreme Court 
decisions comprising the criminal procedure revolution. See PIZZI, supra note 7, at 29–35 (Miranda v. 
Arizona); id. at 50–53 (Duncan v. Louisiana); id. at 87–93 (Mapp v. Ohio). 
 146 See LATZER, supra note 138, at 159–64. 
 147 JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 24–25 (1983). 
 148 Nelson Lund, Outsider Voices on Guns and the Constitution, 17 CONST. COMMENTARY 701, 
703–04 (2000); HARSANYI, supra note 143, at 228–48; Don B. Kates Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the 
Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 250–51 (1983). 
 149 For a summary of most academic attitudes toward the Second Amendment as of 1989, see Sanford 
Levinson, Comment, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 639 (1989) (“To put it 
mildly, the Second Amendment is not at the forefront of constitutional discussion, at least as registered 
in what the academy regards as the venues for such discussion . . . .”); see also Kates, supra note 148, at 
206–07 (summarizing the collective rights view of most academics). 
 150 LATZER, supra note 138, at 122. 
 151 CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 87–88 (Henry Paolucci trans., 1963) (1764). 
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havoc, intimidating, and making our cities even more unlivable.152 Of course, 
there often are multiple reasons for an increase in violent crime, but gun 
prohibitions certainly did not coincide with a drop in crime, as had been 
expected. Police, the only persons in many cities who were legitimately 
armed, were overwhelmed. 
By the early 1980s, scholars began to question both the effectiveness 
and the legality of gun prohibitions. One of the first signs of this awakening 
was Stephen Halbrook’s 1981 article The Jurisprudence of the Second and 
Fourteenth Amendments.153 Halbrook argued that the Second Amendment 
guarantees an individual right to arms, and that the Fourteenth Amendment 
was intended to make the Second Amendment enforceable against the 
states.154 At the time, those arguments were outlandish in academic and legal 
circles.155 But Halbrook’s work, and the work of other scholars, steadily 
revealed a sure foundation for these positions.156 Decades later, the U.S. 
Supreme Court confirmed both of those principles in District of Columbia v. 
Heller (2008)157 and McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010).158 
 
 152 See Daniel D. Polsby, The False Promise of Gun Control, ATLANTIC (1994), https://www. 
theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/03/the-false-promise-of-gun-control/306744/ [https://perma.cc/ 
U6MU-D5NF] (“It is easy to count the bodies of those who have been killed or wounded with guns, but 
not easy to count the people who have avoided harm because they had access t[o] weapons. . . . [P]eople 
who are armed make comparatively unattractive victims. A criminal might not know if any one civilian 
is armed, but if it becomes known that a large number of civilians do carry weapons, criminals will 
become warier.”). 
 153 Stephen P. Halbrook, The Jurisprudence of the Second and Fourteenth Amendments, 4 GEO. 
MASON U. L. REV. 1 (1981). 
 154 Id. at 68. 
 155 See Kates, supra note 149, at 206–07. 
 156 See. e.g., JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-
AMERICAN RIGHT 135–37, 159–64 (1994) (discussing the drafting, intent, and interpretation of the 
Second Amendment as an individual right, drawing on the English tradition); Joyce Lee Malcolm, The 
Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms: The Common Law Tradition, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 285, 
305–14 (1983) (arguing that the Second Amendment is an individual right to bear arms, drawing on the 
English tradition); Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to Self-
Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REV. 103, 10508 (1987) (explaining that the Second Amendment guarantees an 
individual right to bear arms); ROBERT J. COTTROL, GUN CONTROL AND THE CONSTITUTION: SOURCES 
AND EXPLORATIONS ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT, at x–xviii (1994) (arguing that, from a historical 
perspective, the Second Amendment is better viewed as an individual right); Polsby, supra note 152 
(declaring that “most modern scholarship affirms that so far as the drafters of the Bill of Rights were 
concerned, the right to bear arms was to be enjoyed by everyone, not just a militia”); Kates, supra note 
149, at 211–43 (giving numerous detailed reasons why the Second Amendment is an individual right); 
JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 16, at 354–58 (describing the view of St. George Tucker, an influential 
Founding-era commentator on the federal Constitution, that the Second Amendment was an individual 
right); id. at 431–36 (describing the close links between the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 157 554 U.S. 570 (holding that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess 
firearms). 
 158 561 U.S. 742. 
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Meanwhile, apart from this academic and judicial recovery, many 
Americans were rediscovering the importance of the right to keep and bear 
arms. They were noticing a fundamental principle. As Blackstone explained, 
this right is the “right of resistance and self-preservation, when the sanctions 
of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of 
oppression.”159 The police cannot protect us twenty-four hours a day, seven 
days a week. And we have a right to protection. 
Voters exerted pressure on their representatives in legislatures to 
expand the ability to carry a firearm outside the home. In 1987, Florida 
became the first state with major urban populations to ensure that almost all 
law-abiding adults could get a concealed-carry permit.160 Other states swiftly 
followed Florida in becoming “shall issue” states. In the United States, there 
are currently estimated to be over 19 million concealed-carry-permit holders. 
And that number does not include persons who carry in the twenty so-called 
“constitutional carry” states.161 In constitutional carry states, no permit is 
required to carry a firearm in public. On September 1, 2021, Texas will 
become a constitutional carry state, bringing the total to at least twenty-
one.162 
Americans by the millions, of all races and in all areas, are showing by 
their actions what they think about the right to keep and carry arms. They are 
doing it. Gun sales have been soaring, especially to first-time buyers. For 
2020, the FBI’s National Instant Criminal Background Check System 
(NICS) reported that it conducted 21 million background checks for the sale 
of a firearm.163 That was a sixty-percent increase over 2019’s figure of 13.2 
million. In 2020, there were estimated to be 8.4 million first-time gun 
buyers.164 Now forty percent of gun buyers are women.165 And a survey of 
gun retailers reports that gun sales to Black Americans were up fifty-eight 
percent over the previous year, the largest increase for any demographic 
 
 159 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *144. 
 160 Joe Carlucci Uniform Firearms Act, ch. 87-23, 1987 Fla. Laws 133 (codified at FLA. STAT. 
§ 790.33 (2020)). 
 161 Breaking: Constitutional Carry Passes in Iowa and Tennessee, U.S. CONCEALED CARRY  
ASS’N (Apr. 8, 2021), https://www.usconcealedcarry.com/blog/constitutional-carry-passes-ia-tn/ 
[https://perma.cc/9CP4-S5AT]. 
 162 Sami Sparber, Texans Can Carry Handguns Without a License or Training Starting Sept. 1, After 
Gov. Greg Abbott Signs Permitless Carry Bill into Law, TEX. TRIB. (June 16, 2021, 5:00 PM), 
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group.166 The Second Amendment right to bear arms has seen a clear 
reemergence, in contrast to the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury trial. 
CONCLUSION 
We have, on one hand, a substantive right, the Second Amendment, that 
entails individual responsibility and is readily understandable. On the other, 
a procedural right, the Seventh Amendment, involving deeply complicated 
decision-making with almost no accountability. These differences have 
consequences. Many persons seem eager to take advantage of their right to 
keep and bear arms. But, in practice, few exercise their right to civil jury 
trial. The Second Amendment right is vibrant and prominent for many 
citizens. The Seventh Amendment right has shriveled to a husk of its former 
self. Hamilton would not be surprised. 
The problems with constitutional procedural rights described here 
should serve as a warning to other countries and international bodies. 
Specific procedural rights are likely to prove problematic over time, creating 
interpretive quagmires and blockages to reform. 
General procedural rights can be helpful as long as they are not 
interpreted in detailed, confining ways. For example, the Due Process Clause 
generally has not put a straitjacket on civil procedure.167 The European 
Convention on Human Rights contains in Article 6 a right to “a fair and 
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law.”168 That is a good general statement of a 
procedural system’s goals. The European Court of Human Rights applies to 
this article and to others a doctrine, the “margin of appreciation,” that helps 
to protect differences in national procedure and to allow for change.169 U.S. 
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 167 See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (holding that due process generally requires 
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 168 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6, 
213 U.N.T.S. 222, 228 (1950). 
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the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Context of Article 15 of the European Convention on Human 
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International Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 907 (2005) (evaluating the status of the margin of appreciation 
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federal courts might study the margin of appreciation doctrine as an example 
of how to maintain procedural flexibility. 
Courts that must interpret constitutional procedural rights—including 
all courts in the United States—are well advised to tread cautiously and to 
avoid imposing detailed requirements. Flexibility should be afforded to 
legislatures and rules committees to develop new solutions to problems in 
the legal system. Legal systems should be designed, and reformed, by 
keeping the whole in mind. Singling out particular procedures to try to 
preserve, or to instate, is a recipe for failure. 
The procedural rights guaranteed in the Constitution are piecemeal. The 
Constitution does not set out a complete code of criminal procedure, or a 
code of civil procedure—nor should it. In a code of procedure, each part is, 
or ought to be, carefully calibrated with respect to all the others. The 
Constitution, on the other hand, attempts to preserve particular pieces of 
what was an entire common law system. That common law system itself was 
in continual flux. 
No one has praised haphazard growth and development more cogently 
and eloquently than Professor Friedrich Hayek. But even he drew the line at 
the structure of government and at legal procedure. These, he said, should be 
designed deliberately, not left to haphazard growth.170 
  
 
doctrine under international law); Jan Kratochvíl, The Inflation of the Margin of Appreciation by the 
European Court of Human Rights, 29 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 324 (2011) (describing the margin of 
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